Rational Monism and Rational Pluralism. Draft. ...in which I argue against rational monism, and develop a form of rational pluralism that, unlike its rivals, can handle both the Newcomb problems that are counterexamples to evidential decision theory and the unstable problems that are counterexamples to causal decision theory
Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable. Draft. (w/ Arif Ahmed) ...in which we argue that no consequentializable theory of the objective 'ought' is consistent with evidential decision theory. Why Chance Constrains Credence. Draft. (w/ David Builes) ...in which we defend a theory of chancemaking, which entails that every true chance-credence norm is a theorem of the probability calculus.
No Crystal Balls — Forthcoming in Noûs. ...in which I argue that agents are always rationally required to match their credences to their expectations of the present chances.
Why Take Both Boxes? (w/ Ian Wells) — Forthcoming in Philosophy & Phenomenological Research. ...in which we criticize the standard argument for two-boxing by arguing that agents are sometimes rationally required to choose causally dominated options, and then develop an alternative, superior argument for two-boxing.
Able to Do the Impossible — Mind (2017) 126: 465-96. ...in which I argue that an agent might be able to do an action, even though it is metaphysically impossible for the agent to do the action.
Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism — Mind (2016) 125: 511-39. ...in which I argue that truth relativists should accept a relativistic conception of belief, on which beliefs aim, not at truth, but at truth-at-some-contexts.
Relativity and Degrees of Relationality — Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2016) 92: 432-59. ...in which I distinguish various forms of metaphysical relativism and argue for the viability of a particular radical form.