Truth, Relativism, and the Objective Epistemic Ought. Draft.
[A Paper on Knowledge and Rational Choice]. Draft.
[A Paper on the Procreative Asymmetry]. Draft. [A Paper on Chance-Credence Norms]. Draft. (w/ David Builes) ...in which we develop an account of chance and chancemaking that trivializes chance-credence norms.
An Argument Against Causal Decision Theory. Draft. — Forthcoming in Analysis ...in which I argue that agents who embody causal decision theory violate a true principle of rational preference—the Guaranteed Principle.
Rational Monism and Rational Pluralism — Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies ...in which I argue against rational monism, and develop a form of rational pluralism that can handle both Newcomb problems and unstable problems.
Why Take Both Boxes? (w/ Ian Wells) — Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2019) 99: 27-48. ...in which we criticize the standard argument for two-boxing by arguing that agents are sometimes rationally required to choose causally dominated options, and then develop an alternative, superior argument for two-boxing. Able to Do the Impossible — Mind (2017) 126: 465-96. ...in which I argue that an agent might be able to do an action, even though it is metaphysically impossible for the agent to do the action.
Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism — Mind (2016) 125: 511-39. ...in which I argue that truth relativists should accept a relativistic conception of belief, on which beliefs aim, not at truth, but at truth-at-some-contexts.
Relativity and Degrees of Relationality — Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2016) 92: 432-59. ...in which I distinguish various forms of metaphysical relativism and argue for the viability of a particular radical form.