Rational Monism and Rational Pluralism — Philosophical Studies (2021) 178: 1769-2000 ...in which I develop a pluralistic approach to rational choice, which can handle both Newcomb problems and unstable problems.
An Argument Against Causal Decision Theory — Analysis (2021) 81: 52-61 ...in which I argue that agents who embody causal decision theory violate a true principle of rational preference—the Guaranteed Principle.
Why Take Both Boxes? (w/ Ian Wells) — Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2019) 99: 27-48. ...in which we criticize the standard argument for two-boxing by arguing that agents are sometimes rationally required to choose causally dominated options, and then develop an alternative, superior argument for two-boxing. Able to Do the Impossible — Mind (2017) 126: 465-96. ...in which I argue that an agent might be able to do an action, even though it is metaphysically impossible for the agent to do the action.
Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism — Mind (2016) 125: 511-39. ...in which I argue that truth relativists should accept a relativistic conception of belief, on which beliefs aim, not at truth, but at truth-at-some-contexts.
Relativity and Degrees of Relationality — Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2016) 92: 432-59. ...in which I distinguish various forms of metaphysical relativism and argue for the viability of a particular radical form.