Papers
Bigger, Badder Bug (w/ Benjamin A. Levinstein)
— Mind
...in which we argue that Humean Supervenience conflicts with well-motivated chance-credence principles that are strictly weaker than the Principal Principle.
Newcomb, Frustrated (w/ Rhys Borchert)
— Analysis
...in which we develop a hybridization of Newcomb's Problem and the Frustrater, underscoring how difficult it is to reconcile the rationality of taking both boxes in Newcomb's Problem and the rationality of taking the envelope in the Frustrater.
Relativity in a Fundamentally Absolute World
— Philosophical Perspectives
...in which I argue (a) that some facts fail to supervene on the fundamental facts and (b) that facts can fail to supervene on the fundamental facts just if relative.
Intrinsically Desiring the Vague
— Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
...in which I argue that it is rational to intrinsically desire the vague if there are vague propositions.
Can It Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best?
— Australasian Journal of Philosophy
...in which I argue against graded ratifiability.
The Procreative Asymmetry and the Impossibility of Elusive Permission
— Philosophical Studies (2021) 178: 3819-42
...in which I develop a way of explaining the procreative asymmetry.
Knowledge of Objective 'Oughts': Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle. (w/ Daniel Muñoz)
— Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2021) 103: 77-91
...in which we explore the authority of objective 'oughts' and develop a new miners puzzle.
Rational Monism and Rational Pluralism
— Philosophical Studies (2021) 178: 1769-2000
...in which I develop a pluralistic approach to rational choice, which can handle both Newcomb problems and unstable problems.
An Argument Against Causal Decision Theory
— Analysis (2021) 81: 52-61
...in which I argue that agents who embody causal decision theory violate a true principle of rational preference—the Guaranteed Principle.
Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable (w/ Arif Ahmed)
— Mind (2020) 129: 1157-92
...in which we argue that no consequentializable theory of the objective 'ought' is consistent with evidential decision theory.
No Crystal Balls
— Nous (2020) 54: 105-25
...in which I argue that crystal balls are impossible, and hence pose no threat to causal decision theory.
Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in Radiology: Summary of the Joint
European and North American Multisociety Statement (w/ 17 others)
— Radiology (2019) 294: 436-40;
— Insights into Imaging (2019) 10: 101;
— Journal of the American College of Radiology (2019) 16: 1516-21; and
— Canadian Association of Radiologists Journal (2019) 70: 329-34.
...in which we consider the major ethical questions that advancements in artificial intelligence pose in radiology. The full statement is published as an appendix and can be found here.
Why Take Both Boxes? (w/ Ian Wells)
— Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2019) 99: 27-48.
...in which we criticize the standard argument for two-boxing by arguing that agents are sometimes rationally required to choose causally dominated options, and then develop an alternative, superior argument for two-boxing.
Able to Do the Impossible
— Mind (2017) 126: 465-96.
...in which I argue that an agent might be able to do an action, even though it is metaphysically impossible for the agent to do the action.
Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism
— Mind (2016) 125: 511-39.
...in which I argue that truth relativists should accept a relativistic conception of belief, on which beliefs aim, not at truth, but at truth-at-some-contexts.
Relativity and Degrees of Relationality
— Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2016) 92: 432-59.
...in which I distinguish various forms of metaphysical relativism and argue for the viability of a particular radical form.
Reviews
Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem.
— Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2019)
Bigger, Badder Bug (w/ Benjamin A. Levinstein)
— Mind
...in which we argue that Humean Supervenience conflicts with well-motivated chance-credence principles that are strictly weaker than the Principal Principle.
Newcomb, Frustrated (w/ Rhys Borchert)
— Analysis
...in which we develop a hybridization of Newcomb's Problem and the Frustrater, underscoring how difficult it is to reconcile the rationality of taking both boxes in Newcomb's Problem and the rationality of taking the envelope in the Frustrater.
Relativity in a Fundamentally Absolute World
— Philosophical Perspectives
...in which I argue (a) that some facts fail to supervene on the fundamental facts and (b) that facts can fail to supervene on the fundamental facts just if relative.
Intrinsically Desiring the Vague
— Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
...in which I argue that it is rational to intrinsically desire the vague if there are vague propositions.
Can It Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best?
— Australasian Journal of Philosophy
...in which I argue against graded ratifiability.
The Procreative Asymmetry and the Impossibility of Elusive Permission
— Philosophical Studies (2021) 178: 3819-42
...in which I develop a way of explaining the procreative asymmetry.
Knowledge of Objective 'Oughts': Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle. (w/ Daniel Muñoz)
— Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2021) 103: 77-91
...in which we explore the authority of objective 'oughts' and develop a new miners puzzle.
Rational Monism and Rational Pluralism
— Philosophical Studies (2021) 178: 1769-2000
...in which I develop a pluralistic approach to rational choice, which can handle both Newcomb problems and unstable problems.
An Argument Against Causal Decision Theory
— Analysis (2021) 81: 52-61
...in which I argue that agents who embody causal decision theory violate a true principle of rational preference—the Guaranteed Principle.
Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable (w/ Arif Ahmed)
— Mind (2020) 129: 1157-92
...in which we argue that no consequentializable theory of the objective 'ought' is consistent with evidential decision theory.
No Crystal Balls
— Nous (2020) 54: 105-25
...in which I argue that crystal balls are impossible, and hence pose no threat to causal decision theory.
Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in Radiology: Summary of the Joint
European and North American Multisociety Statement (w/ 17 others)
— Radiology (2019) 294: 436-40;
— Insights into Imaging (2019) 10: 101;
— Journal of the American College of Radiology (2019) 16: 1516-21; and
— Canadian Association of Radiologists Journal (2019) 70: 329-34.
...in which we consider the major ethical questions that advancements in artificial intelligence pose in radiology. The full statement is published as an appendix and can be found here.
Why Take Both Boxes? (w/ Ian Wells)
— Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2019) 99: 27-48.
...in which we criticize the standard argument for two-boxing by arguing that agents are sometimes rationally required to choose causally dominated options, and then develop an alternative, superior argument for two-boxing.
Able to Do the Impossible
— Mind (2017) 126: 465-96.
...in which I argue that an agent might be able to do an action, even though it is metaphysically impossible for the agent to do the action.
Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism
— Mind (2016) 125: 511-39.
...in which I argue that truth relativists should accept a relativistic conception of belief, on which beliefs aim, not at truth, but at truth-at-some-contexts.
Relativity and Degrees of Relationality
— Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2016) 92: 432-59.
...in which I distinguish various forms of metaphysical relativism and argue for the viability of a particular radical form.
Reviews
Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem.
— Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2019)