Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable. Draft. (w/ Arif Ahmed) ...in which we argue that no consequentializable theory of the objective 'ought' is consistent with evidential decision theory.
Why Chance Constrains Credence. Draft. (w/ David Builes) ...in which we defend a theory of chancemaking, which entails that every true chance-credence norm is a theorem of the probability calculus.
The Macro-Micro Gap. Draft. (w/ Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt) ...in which we argue that 3d'ism leads to unacceptable macro-micro gaps and therefore should be rejected in favor of 4d'ism. No Crystal Balls — Forthcoming in Noûs. ...in which I argue that agents are always rationally required to match their credences to their expectations of the present chances.
Why Take Both Boxes? (w/ Ian Wells) — Forthcoming in Philosophy & Phenomenological Research. ...in which we criticize the standard argument for two-boxing by arguing that agents are sometimes rationally required to choose causally dominated options, and then develop an alternative, superior argument for two-boxing.
Able to Do the Impossible — Mind (2017) 126: 465-96. ...in which I argue that an agent might be able to do an action, even though it is metaphysically impossible for the agent to do the action.
Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism — Mind (2016) 125: 511-39. ...in which I argue that truth relativists should accept a relativistic conception of belief, on which beliefs aim, not at truth, but at truth-at-some-contexts.
Relativity and Degrees of Relationality — Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2016) 92: 432-59. ...in which I distinguish various forms of metaphysical relativism and argue for the viability of a particular radical form.